This presentation is a systematic attempt to map the problem of sensory illusion and hallucination in Husserl’s taxonomy of intentional lived-experience. Its purpose is to outline a complete phenomenology of illusion and hallucination by drawing a cartography of intuitive consciousness. This cartography will allow one to orient herself in understanding the general nature of these phenomena, to distinguish structurally different forms of illusory and hallucinatory experiences, and to rigorously identify the different noetic conditions for their emergence in experience. In light of the distinction between cases of illusion and hallucination, the analysis will be structured into two interconnected parts. A phenomenology of ‘nullifying semblance’ will first be carried out by identifying Husserl’s most general characterization of illusion. In contrast to many contemporary accounts, here the problem of illusion is not restricted to cases of deceptive experience but includes different modes of intuition. The second part of the presentation will reconstruct Husserl’s account of hallucination by means of the analysis of specific act-species of intuitive acts and their temporality.